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Topos theory, a branch of category theory, has been proposed as mathe-
matical basis for the formulation of physical theories. In this article, we give
a brief introduction to this approach, emphasising the logical aspects. Each
topos serves as a ‘mathematical universe’ with an internal logic, which is used
to assign truth-values to all propositions about a physical system. We show in
detail how this works for (algebraic) quantum theory.
“The problem is all inside your head”, she said to me
the answer is easy if you take it logically
Paul Simon (from ‘50 Ways To Leave Your Lover’ )
1 Introduction
The use of topos theory in the foundations of physics and, in particular, the foundations
of quantum theory was suggested by Chris Isham more than 10 years ago in [Ish97].
Subsequently, these ideas were developed in an application to the Kochen-Specker theorem
(with Jeremy Butterfield, [IB98, IB99, IBH00, IB02], for conceptual considerations see
[IB00]). In these papers, the use of a multi-valued, contextual logic for quantum theory
was proposed. This logic is given by the internal logic of a certain topos of presheaves over
a category of contexts. Here, contexts typically are abelian parts of a larger, non-abelian
structure. There are several possible choices for the context category. We will concentrate
on algebraic quantum theory and use the category V(R) of unital abelian von Neumann
∗a.doering@imperial.ac.uk
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subalgebras of the non-abelian von Neumann algebra of observables R of the quantum
system, as first suggested in [IBH00].
The use of presheaves over such a category of contexts is motivated by the very natural
construction of the spectral presheaf Σ, which collects all the Gel’fand spectra of the
abelian subalgebras V ∈ V(R) into one larger structure. The Gel’fand spectra can be
seen as ‘local state spaces’, and the spectral presheaf serves as a state space analogue for
quantum theory. Interestingly, as Isham and Butterfield showed, this presheaf is not like a
space: it has no points (in a category-theoretical sense), and this fact is exactly equivalent
to the Kochen-Specker theorem.
The topos approach was developed considerably in the series of papers [DI07a, DI07b,
DI07c, DI07d] by Chris Isham and the author. In these papers, it was shown how topos
theory can serve as a new mathematical framework for the formulation of physical theories.
The basic idea of the topos programme is that by representing the relevant physical struc-
tures (states, physical quantities and propositions about physical quantities) in suitable
topoi, one can achieve a remarkable structural similarity between classical and quantum
physics. Moreover, the topos programme is general enough to allow for major generali-
sations. Theories beyond classical and quantum theory are conceivable. Arguably, this
generality will be needed in a future theory of quantum gravity, which is expected to go
well beyond our conventional theories.
In this paper, we will concentrate on algebraic quantum theory. We briefly motivate the
mathematical constructions and give the main definitions.1 Throughout, we concentrate
on the logical aspects of the theory. We will show in detail how, given a state, truth-
values are assigned to all propositions about a quantum system. This is independent of
any measurement or observer. For that reason, we say that the topos approach gives a
‘neo-realist’ formulation of quantum theory.
1.1 What is a topos?
It is impossible to give even the briefest introduction to topos theory here. At the danger
of being highly imprecise, we restrict ourselves to mentioning some aspects of this well-
developed mathematical theory and give a number of pointers to the literature. The aim
merely is to give a very rough idea of the structure and internal logic of a topos. In the
next subsection, we argue that this mathematical structure may be useful in physics.
There are a number of excellent textbooks on topos theory, and the reader should consult
at least one of them. We found the following books useful: [LR03, Gol84, MM92, Joh02a,
Joh02b, Bell88, LS86].
1We suppose that the reader is familiar with the definitions of a category, functor and natural transfor-
mation.
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Topoi as mathematical universes. Every (elementary) topos E can be seen as a
mathematical universe. As a category, a topos E possesses a number of structures that gen-
eralise constructions that are possible in the category Set of sets and functions.2 Namely,
in Set, we can construct new sets from given ones in several ways: let S, T be two sets,
then we can form the cartesian product S×T , the disjoint union S∐T and the exponential
ST , the set of all functions from T to S. These constructions turn out to be fundamental
and can all be phrased in an abstract, categorical manner, where they are called finite
limits, colimits and exponentials, respectively. By definition, a topos E has all of these.
One consequence of the existence of finite limits is that each topos has a terminal object,
denoted by 1. This is characterised by the property that for any object A in the topos E ,
there exists exactly one arrow from A to 1. In Set, a one-element set 1 = {∗} is terminal.3
Of course, Set is a topos, too, and it is precisely the topos which usually plays the roˆle
of our mathematical universe, since we construct our mathematical objects starting from
sets and functions between them. As a slogan, we have: a topos E is a category similar
to Set. A very nice and gentle introduction to these aspects of topos theory is the book
[LR03]. Other good sources are [Gol84, McL71].
In order to ‘do mathematics’, one must also have a logic, including a deductive system.
Each topos comes equipped with an internal logic, which is of intuitionistic type. We
very briefly sketch the main characteristics of intuitionistic logic and the mathematical
structures in a topos that realise this logic.
Intuitionistic logic. Intuitionistic logic is similar to Boolean logic, the main difference
being that the law of excluded middle need not hold. In intuitionistic logic, there is no
axiom
⊢ a ∨ ¬a (∗)
like in Boolean logic. Here, ¬a is the negation of the formula (or proposition) a. The
algebraic structures representing intuitionistic logic are Heyting algebras. A Heyting alge-
bra is a pseudocomplemented, distributive lattice4 with zero element 0 and unit element
1, representing ‘totally false’ resp. ‘totally true’. The pseudocomplement is denoted by ¬,
and one has, for all elements α of a Heyting algebra H ,
α ∨ ¬α ≤ 1,
in contrast to α∨¬α = 1 in a Boolean algebra. This means that the disjunction (“Or”) of a
proposition α and its negation need not be (totally) true in a Heyting algebra. Equivalently,
2More precisely, small sets and functions between them. Small means that we do not have proper classes.
One must take care in these foundational issues to avoid problems like Russell’s paradox.
3Like many categorical constructions, the terminal object is fixed only up to isomorphism: any two one-
element sets are isomorphic, and any of them can serve as a terminal object. Nonetheless, one speaks
of the terminal object.
4Lattice is meant in the algebraic sense: a partially ordered set L such that any two elements a, b ∈ L
have a minimum (greatest lower bound) a∧ b and a maximum (least upper bound) a∨ b in L. A lattice
L is distributive if and only if a∨ (b∧ c) = (a∨ b)∧ (a∨ c) as well as a∧ (b∨ c) = (a∧ b)∨ (a∧ c) hold
for all a, b, c ∈ L.
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one has
¬¬α ≥ α,
in contrast to ¬¬α = α in Boolean algebras.
Obviously, Boolean logic is a special case of intuitionistic logic. It is known from Stone’s
theorem [Sto36] that each Boolean algebra is isomorphic to an algebra of (clopen, i.e.,
closed and open) subsets of a suitable (topological) space.
Let X be a set, and let P (X) be the power set of X , that is, the set of subsets of X .
Given a subset S ∈ P (X), one can ask for each point x ∈ X whether it lies in S or not.
This can be expressed by the characteristic function χS : X → {0, 1}, which is defined as
χS(x) :=
{
1 if x ∈ S
0 if x /∈ S
for all x ∈ X . The two-element set {0, 1} plays the roˆle of a set of truth-values for
propositions (of the form “x ∈ S”). Clearly, 1 corresponds to ‘true’, 0 corresponds to
‘false’, and there are no other possibilities. This is an argument about sets, so it takes
place in and uses the logic of the topos Set of sets and functions. Set is a Boolean topos,
in which the familiar two-valued logic and the axiom (∗) hold. (This does not contradict
the fact that the internal logic of topoi is intuitionistic, since Boolean logic is a special case
of intuitionistic logic.)
In an arbitrary topos, there is a special object Ω, called the subobject classifier, that
takes the roˆle of the set {0, 1} ≃ {false,true} of truth-values. Let B be an object in the
topos, and let A be a subobject of B. This means that there is a monic A→ B,5 general-
ising the inclusion of a subset S into a larger set X . Like in Set, we can also characterise
A as a subobject of B by an arrow from B to the subobject classifier Ω. (In Set, this
arrow is the characteristic function χS : X → {0, 1}.) Intuitively, this characteristic arrow
from B to Ω tells us how A ‘lies in’ B. The textbook definition is:
Definition 1 In a category C with finite limits, a subobject classifier is an object Ω,
together with a monic true : 1 → Ω, such that to every monic m : A → B in C there is a
unique arrow χ which, with the given monic, forms a pullback square
B Ω✲χ
A 1✲
❄
❄
m
❄
❄
true
5A monic is the categorical version of an injective function. In the topos Set, monics exactly are injective
functions.
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In Set, the arrow true : 1 → {0, 1} is given by true(∗) = 1. In general, the subobject
classifier Ω need not be a set, since it is an object in the topos E , and the objects of
E need not be sets. Nonetheless, there is an abstract notion of elements (or points) in
category theory that we can use. The elements of Ω are the truth-values available in the
internal logic of our topos E , just like ‘false’ and ‘true’, the elements of {false,true}, are
the truth-values available in the topos Set.
To understand the abstract notion of elements, let us consider sets for a moment. Let
1 = {∗} be a one-element set, the terminal object in Set. Let S be a set and consider an
arrow e from 1 to S. Clearly, e(∗) ∈ S is one element of S. The set of all functions from
1 to S corresponds exactly to the elements of S. This idea can be generalised to other
categories: if there is a terminal object 1, then we consider arrows from 1 to an object A in
the category as elements of A. For example, in the definition of the subobject classifier the
arrow true : 1→ Ω is an element of Ω. It may happen that an object A has no elements,
i.e., there are no arrows 1→ A. It is common to consider arrows from subobjects U of A
to A as generalised elements, but we will not need this except briefly in subsection 5.1.
As mentioned, the elements of the subobject classifier, understood as the arrows 1→ Ω,
are the truth-values. Moreover, the set of these arrows forms a Heyting algebra (see, for
example, section 8.3 in [Gol84]). This is how (the algebraic representation of) intuitionistic
logic manifests itself in a topos. Another, closely related fact is that the subobjects of any
object A in a topos form a Heyting algebra.
1.2 Topos theory and physics
A large part of the work on topos theory in physics consists in showing how states, physical
quantities and propositions about physical quantities can be represented within a suitable
topos attached to the system [DI07a, DI07b, DI07c, DI07d]. The choice of topos will
depend on the theory type (classical, quantum or, in future developments, even something
completely new). Let us consider classical physics for the moment to motivate this.
Realism in classical physics. In classical physics, one has a space of states S, and
physical quantities A are represented by real-valued functions fA : S → R.
6 A proposition
about a physical quantity A is of the form “A ∈ ∆”, which means “the physical quantity
A has a value in the (Borel) set ∆”. This proposition is represented by the inverse image
f−1A (∆) ⊆ S. In general, propositions about the physical system correspond to Borel
subsets of the state space S. If we have two propositions “A ∈ ∆1”, “B ∈ ∆2” and
the corresponding subsets f−1A (∆1), f
−1
B (∆2), then the intersection f
−1
A (∆1) ∩ f
−1
B (∆2)
corresponds to the proposition “A ∈ ∆1 and B ∈ ∆2”, the union f
−1
A (∆1) ∪ f
−1
B (∆2)
corresponds to “A ∈ ∆1 or B ∈ ∆2”, and the complement S\f
−1
A (∆1) corresponds to the
negation “A /∈ ∆1”. Moreover, given a state s, i.e., an element of the state space S, each
proposition is either true or false: if s lies in the subset of S representing the proposition,
6We assume that fA is at least measurable.
5
then the proposition is true, otherwise it is false. Every physical quantity A has a value
in the state s, namely fA(s) ∈ R. Thus classical physics is a realist theory in which
propositions have truth-values independent of measurements, observers etc. The logic is
Boolean, since classical physics is based on constructions with sets and functions, i.e., it
takes place in the topos Set. We take this as a rule: if we want to describe a physical
system S as a classical system, then the topos Set is used. This means no departure from
what is ordinarily done, but it emphasises certain structural and logical aspects of the
theory.
Instrumentalism in quantum theory. In quantum theory, the mathematical de-
scription is very different. Physical quantities A are represented by self-adjoint operators
Â on a Hilbert space H. While H can be called a space of states, the states ψ ∈ H play a
very different roˆle from those in classical theory. In particular, a state ψ does not assign
values to all physical quantities, only to those for which ψ happens to be an eigenstate.
The spectral theorem shows that propositions “A ∈ ∆” are represented by projection op-
erators Ê[A ∈ ∆] on Hilbert space. Unless ψ is an eigenstate of A, such a proposition is
neither true nor false (except for the trivial cases Ê[A ∈ ∆] = 0̂, which represents trivially
false propositions, and Ê[A ∈ ∆] = 1̂, which represents trivially true propositions). The
mathematical formalism of quantum theory is interpreted in an instrumentalist manner:
given a state ψ, the proposition “A ∈ ∆” is assigned a probability of being true, given
by the expectation value p(A ∈ ∆;ψ) := 〈ψ| Ê[A ∈ ∆] |ψ〉. This means that upon mea-
surement of the physical quantity A, one will find the measurement result to lie in ∆ with
probability p(A ∈ ∆;ψ). This interpretation depends on measurements and an external
observer. Moreover, the measurement devices (and the observer) are described in terms of
classical physics, not quantum physics.
The motivation from quantum gravity. An instrumentalist interpretation cannot
describe closed quantum systems, at least there is nothing much to be said about them
from this perspective. A theory of quantum cosmology or quantum gravity will presum-
ably be a quantum theory of the whole universe. Since there is no external observer who
could perform measurements in such a theory, instrumentalism becomes meaningless. One
of the main motivations for the topos programme is to overcome or circumvent the usual
instrumentalism of quantum theory and to replace it with a more realist account of quan-
tum systems. The idea is to use the internal logic of a topos to assign truth-values to
propositions about the system.
In order to achieve this, we will sketch a new mathematical formulation of quantum
theory that is structurally similar to classical physics. The details can be found in [DI07a,
DI07b, DI07c, DI07d] and references therein.
Plan of the paper. The starting point is the definition of a formal language L(S)
attached to a physical system S. This is done in section 2 and emphasises the common
structure of classical and quantum physics. In section 3, we introduce the topos asso-
ciated to a system S in the case of quantum theory, and in section 4 we briefly discuss
the representation of L(S) in this topos. The representation of states and the assignment
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of truth-values to propositions is treated in section 5, which is the longest and most de-
tailed section. Section 6 concludes with some remarks on related work and on possible
generalisations.
2 A formal language for physics
There is a well-developed branch of topos theory that puts emphasis on the logical as-
pects. As already mentioned, a topos can be seen as the embodiment of (higher-order)
intuitionistic logic. This point of view is expounded in detail in Bell’s book [Bell88], which
is our standard reference on these matters. Other excellent sources are [LS86] and part
D of [Joh02b]. The basic concept consists in defining a formal language and then find-
ing a representation of it in a suitable topos. As usual in mathematical logic, the formal
language encodes the syntactic aspects of the theory and the representation provides the
semantics. Topoi are a natural ‘home’ for the representation of formal languages encoding
intuitionistic logic, more precisely, intuitionistic, higher-order, typed predicate logic with
equality. Typed means that there are several primitive species or kinds of objects (instead
of just sets as primitives), from which sets are extracted as a subspecies; predicate logic
means that one has quantifiers, namely an existence quantifier ∃ (“it exists”) and a uni-
versal quantifier ∀ (“for all”). Higher-order refers to the fact that quantification can take
place not only over variable individuals, but also over subsets and functions of individuals
as well as iterates of these constructions. Bell presents a particularly elegant way to specify
a formal language with these properties. He calls this type of language a local language,
see chapter 3 of [Bell88].
Let S denote a physical system to which we attach a higher-order, typed language L(S).
We can only sketch the most important aspects here, details can be found in section 4
of [DI07a]. The language L(S) does not depend on the theory type (classical, quantum,
...), while its representation of course does. The language contains at least the following
type symbols: 1,Ω,Σ and R. The symbol Σ serves as a precursor of the state object (see
below), the symbol R is a precursor of the quantity-value object, which is where physical
quantities take their values. Moreover, we require the existence of function symbols of the
form A : Σ→R. These are the linguistic precursors of physical quantities. For each type,
there exist variables of that type. There are a number of rules how to form terms and
formulae (terms of type Ω) from variables of the various types, including the definition of
logical connectives ∧ (“And”), ∨ (“Or”) and ¬ (“Not”). Moreover, there are axioms giving
rules of inference that define how to get new formulae from sets of given formulae. As an
example, we mention the cut rule: if Γ is a set of formulae and α and β are formulae, then
we have
Γ : α α,Γ : β
Γ : β
(here, any free variable in α must be free in Γ or β). In a representation, where the
formulae aquire an interpretation and a ‘meaning’, this expresses that if Γ implies α, and
α and Γ together imply β, then Γ also implies β. The axioms and rules of inference are
chosen in a way such that the logical operations satisfy the laws of intuitionistic logic.
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The formal language L(S) captures a number of abstract properties of the physical
system S. For example, if S is the harmonic oscillator, then we expect to be able to
speak about the physical quantity energy in all theory types, classical or quantum (or
other). Thus, among the function symbols A : Σ → R, there will be one symbol E :
Σ→R which, in a representation, will become the mathematical entity describing energy.
(Which mathematical object that will be depends on the theory type and thus on the
representation.)
The representation of the language L(S) takes place in a suitable, physically motivated
topos E . The type symbol 1 is represented by the terminal object 1 in E , the type symbol
Ω is represented by the subobject classifier Ω. The choice of an appropriate object Σ in the
topos that represents the symbol Σ depends on physical insight. The representing object
Σ is called the state object, and it plays the roˆle of a generalised state space. What actually
is generalised is the space, not the states: Σ is an object in a topos E , which need not be
a topos of sets, so Σ need not be a set or space-like. However, as an object in a topos,
Σ does have subobjects. These subobjects will be interpreted as (the representatives of)
propositions about the physical quantities, just like in classical physics, where propositions
correspond to subsets of state space. The propositions are of the form “A ∈ ∆”, where ∆
now is a subobject of the object R that represents the symbol R. The object R is called
the quantity-value object, and this is where physical quantities take their values. Somewhat
surprisingly, even for ordinary quantum theory this is not the real number object in the
topos. Finally, the function symbols A : Σ → R are represented by arrows betwen the
objects Σ and R in the topos E .
In classical physics, the representation is the obvious one: the topos to be used is the
topos Set of sets and mappings, the symbol Σ is represented by a symplectic manifold S
which is the state space, the symbol R is represented by the real numbers and function
symbols A : Σ → R are represented by real-valued functions fA : S → R. Propositions
about physical quantities correspond to subsets of the state space.
3 The context category V(R) and the topos of
presheaves SetV(R)
op
We will now discuss the representation of L(S) in the case that S is to be described as a
quantum system. We assume that S is a non-trivial system that−in the usual description−
has a Hilbert space H of dimension 3 or greater, and that the physical quantities belonging
to S form a von Neumann algebra R(S) ⊆ B(H) that contains the identity operator 1̂.7
From the Kochen-Specker theorem [KS67] we know that there is no state space model
of quantum theory if the algebra of observables is B(H) (for the generalisation to von
Neumann algebras see [Doe05]). More concretely, there is no state space S such that the
physical quantities are real-valued functions on S. The reason is that if there existed such
7 There should arise no confusion between the von Neumann algebra R = R(S) and the symbol R of
our formal language, we hope.
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a state space S, then each point (i.e., state) s ∈ S would allow to assign values to all
physical quantities at once, simply by evaluating the functions representing the physical
quantities at s. One can show that under very mild and natural conditions, this leads to
a mathematical contradiction.
For an abelian von Neumann algebra V , there is no such obstacle: the Gel’fand spectrum
ΣV of V can be interpreted as a state space, and the Gel’fand transforms A of self-adjoint
operators Â ∈ V , representing physical quantities, are real-valued functions on ΣV . The
Gel’fand spectrum ΣV of an abelian von Neumann algebra V consists of the pure states λ
on V (see e.g. [KR83]). Each λ ∈ ΣV also is a multiplicative state; for all Â, B̂ ∈ V , we
have
λ(ÂB̂) = λ(Â)λ(B̂),
which, for projections P̂ ∈ P(V ), implies
λ(P̂ ) = λ(P̂ 2) = λ(P̂ )λ(P̂ ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Finally, each λ ∈ ΣV is an algebra homomorphism from V to C. The Gel’fand spectrum
ΣV is equipped with the weak* topology and thus becomes a compact Hausdorff space.
Let Â ∈ V and define
A : ΣV −→ C
λ 7−→ A(λ) := λ(Â).
The function A is called the Gel’fand transform of Â. It is a continuous function such that
imA = sp Â. In particular, if Â is self-adjoint, then λ(Â) ∈ sp Â ⊂ R. The mapping
V −→ C(ΣV )
Â 7−→ A
is called the Gel’fand transformation on V . It is an isometric ∗-isomorphism between V
and C(ΣV ).
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This leads to the idea of considering the set V(R) of non-trivial unital abelian von
Neumann subalgebras of R.9 These abelian subalgebras are also called contexts. V(R)
is partially ordered by inclusion and thus becomes a category. There is an arrow iV ′V :
V ′ → V if and only if V ′ ⊆ V , and then iV ′V is just the inclusion (or the identity arrow
if V ′ = V ). The category V(R) is called the context category and serves as our index
category. The process of going from one abelian algebra V to a smaller algebra V ′ ⊂ V
can be seen as a process of coarse-graining : the algebra V ′ contains less physical quantities
(self-adjoint operators), so we can describe less physics in V ′ than in V . We collect all the
‘local state spaces’ ΣV into one large object:
8Of course, all this holds more generally for abelian C∗-algebras. We concentrate on von Neumann
algebras, since we need these in our application.
9We exclude the trivial algebra C1̂, which is a subalgebra of all other subalgebras.
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Definition 2 The spectral presheaf Σ is the presheaf10 over V(R) defined
a) on objects: for all V ∈ V(R), ΣV = ΣV is the Gel’fand spectrum of V ,
b) on arrows: for all iV ′V , Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′ is given by restriction, λ 7→ λ|V ′.
The spectral presheaf was first considered by Chris Isham and Jeremy Butterfield in
the series [IB98, IB99, IBH00, IB02] (see in particular the third of these papers). The
presheaves over V(R) form a topos SetV(R)
op
. The arrows in this topos are natural trans-
formations between the presheaves. Isham and Butterfield developed the idea that this
is the appropriate topos for quantum theory. The object Σ in SetV(R)
op
serves as a state
space analogue. In the light of the new developments in [DI07a]-[DI07d], using formal
languages, we identify Σ as the state object in SetV(R)
op
, i.e., the representative of the
symbol Σ of our formal language L(S).
Isham and Butterfield showed that the Kochen-Specker theorem is exactly equivalent
to the fact that the spectral presheaf Σ has no elements, in the sense that there are no
arrows from the terminal object 1 in SetV(R)
op
to Σ. It is not hard to show that having an
element of Σ would allow the assignment of real values to all physical quantities at once.
4 Representing L(S) in the presheaf topos SetV(R)
op
The quantity-value object for quantum theory. We already have identified the topos
for the quantum-theoretical description of a system S and the state object Σ in this topos.
Let V ∈ V(R) be a context, then ↓V := {V ′ ∈ V(R) | V ′ ⊆ V } denotes the set of all
subalgebras of V , equipped with the partial order inherited from V(R). It can be shown
that the symbol R should be represented by the following presheaf [DI07c]:
Definition 3 The presheaf R↔ of order-preserving and -reversing functions on
V(R) is defined
a) on objects: for all V ∈ V(R), R↔V := {(µ, ν) | µ :↓V → R is order-preserving,
ν :↓V → R is order-reversing and µ ≤ ν},
b) on arrows: for all iV ′V , R
↔(iV ′V ) : R
↔
V → R
↔
V ′ is given by restriction, (µ, ν) 7→
(µ|V ′ , ν|V ′).
Here, an order-preserving function µ :↓V → R is a function such that V ′′ ⊆ V ′ (where
V ′, V ′′ ∈↓V ) implies µ(V ′′) ≤ µ(V ′). Order-reversing functions are defined analogously.
The presheaf R↔ is not the real-number object R in the topos SetV(R)
op
, which is the
constant presheaf defined by R(V ) := R for all V and R(iV ′V ) : R→ R as the identity.
From the Kochen-Specker theorem, we would not expect that physical quantities take their
values in the real numbers. (This does not mean that the results of measurements are not
10A presheaf is a contravariant functor from V(R) to Set, and obviously, Σ is of this kind. In our notation,
presheaves will always be underlined.
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real numbers. We do not discuss measurement here.) More importantly, the presheaf R↔
takes into account the coarse-graining inherent in the base category V(R): at each stage
V , a pair (µ, ν) consisting of an order-preserving and an order-reversing function defines
a whole range or interval [µ(V ), ν(V )] of real numbers, not just a single real number. (It
can happen that µ(V ) = ν(V ).) If we go to a smaller subalgebra V ′ ⊂ V , which is a kind
of coarse-graining, then we have µ(V ′) ≤ µ(V ) and ν(V ′) ≥ ν(V ), so the corresponding
interval [µ(V ′), ν(V ′)] can only become larger.
The representation of function symbols A : Σ → R. In order to represent a
physical quantity A belonging to the system S as an arrow from Σ to the presheaf R↔ of
‘values’, we have to use a two-step process.
1. Let Â ∈ R be the self-adjoint operator representing A. For each abelian subalgebra
V ∈ V(R), we define
δo(Â)V :=
∧
{B̂ ∈ Vsa|B̂ ≥s Â},
δi(Â)V :=
∨
{Ĉ ∈ Vsa|Ĉ ≤s Â}.
Here, the spectral order on self-adjoint operators is used [Ols71, deG05]. This is defined
for all self-adjoint operators Â, B̂ with spectral families ÊA resp. ÊB as
Â ≤s B̂ :⇔ (∀λ ∈ R : Ê
A
λ ≥ Ê
B
λ ).
Equipped with the spectral order, the set of self-adjoint operators in a von Neumann
algebra becomes a boundedly complete lattice. In particular, the mappings δoV , δ
i
V : Rsa →
Vsa are well-defined. We call these mappings outer and inner daseinisation, respectively.
The outer daseinisation δo(Â)V of Â to the context V is the approximation from above by
the smallest self-adjoint operator in V that is spectrally larger than Â. Likewise, the inner
daseinisation δi(Â)V is the approximation from below by the largest self-adjoint operator
in V that is spectrally smaller then Â. Since the spectral order is coarser than the usual,
linear order, we have, for all V ,
δi(Â)V ≤ Â ≤ δ
o(Â)V .
One can show that the spectra of δi(Â)V and δ
o(Â)V are subsets of the spectrum of Â,
which seems physically very sensible. If we used the approximation in the linear order,
this would not hold in general. The approximation of self-adjoint operators in the spectral
order was suggested by de Groote [deG05b, deG07]. If V ′ ⊂ V , then, by construction,
δi(Â)V ′ ≤s δ
i(Â)V and δ
o(Â)V ′ ≥s δ
o(Â)V , which implies
δi(Â)V ′ ≤ δ
i(Â)V ,
δo(Â)V ′ ≥ δ
o(Â)V .
In this sense, the approximations to Â become coarser if the context becomes smaller.
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2. Now that we have constructed a pair (δi(Â)V , δ
o(Â)V ) of operators approximating
Â from below and from above for each context V , we can define a natural transformation
δ˘(Â) from Σ to R↔ in the following way: let V ∈ V(R) be a context, and let λ ∈ ΣV be a
pure state of V . Then define, for all V ′ ∈↓V ,
µλ(V
′) := λ(δi(Â)V ′) = δi(Â)V ′(λ),
where δi(Â)V ′ is the Gel’fand transform of the self-adjoint operator δ
i(Â)V ′. From the
theory of abelian C∗-algebras, it is known that λ(δi(Â)V ′) ∈ sp(δ
i(Â)V ′) (see e.g. [KR83]).
Let V ′, V ′′ ∈↓ V such that V ′′ ⊂ V ′. We saw that δi(Â)V ′′ ≤ δ
i(Â)V ′, which implies
λ(δi(Â)V ′′) ≤ λ(δ
i(Â)V ′), so µλ :↓V → R is an order-preserving function. Analogously, let
νλ(V
′) := λ(δo(Â)V ′) = δo(Â)V ′(λ)
for all V ′ ∈↓ V . We obtain an order-reversing function νλ :↓ V → R. Then, for all
V ∈ V(R), let
δ˘(Â)(V ) : ΣV −→ R
↔
V
λ 7−→ (µλ, νλ).
By construction, these mappings are the components of a natural transformation δ˘(Â):
Σ→ R↔. For all V, V ′ ∈ V(R) such that V ′ ⊆ V , we have a commuting diagram
R↔V R
↔
V ′
✲
R
↔(iV ′V )
ΣV ΣV ′✲
Σ(iV ′V )
❄
δ˘(Â)(V )
❄
δ˘(Â)(V ′)
The arrow δ˘(Â) : Σ → R↔ in the presheaf topos SetV(R)
op
is the representative of the
physical quantity A, which is abstractly described by the function symbol A : Σ → R
in our formal language. The physical content, namely the appropriate choice of the self-
adjoint operator Â from which we construct the arrow δ˘(Â), is not part of the language,
but part of the representation.11
The representation of propositions. As discussed in subsection 1.2, in classical
physics the subset of state space S representing a proposition “A ∈ ∆” is constructed by
taking the inverse image f−1A (∆) of ∆ under the function representing A. We will use the
analogous construction in the topos formulation of quantum theory: the set ∆ is a subset
(that is, subobject) of the quantity-value object R in classical physics, so we start from
11The current scheme is not completely topos-internal yet. It is an open question if every arrow from
Σ to R↔ comes from a self-adjoint operator. This is why we start from a self-adjoint operator Â to
construct δ˘(Â). We are working on a more internal characterisation.
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a subobject Θ of the presheaf R↔. We get a subobject of the state object Σ by pullback
along δ˘(Â), which we denote by δ˘(Â)−1(Θ).12 For details see subsection 3.6 in [DI07c] and
also [HS07].
In both classical and quantum theory, propositions are represented by subobjects of
the quantity-value object (state space S resp. spectral presheaf Σ). Such subobjects are
constructed by pullback from subobjects of the quantity-value object (real numbers R
resp. presheaf of order-preserving and -reversing functions R↔). The interpretation and
meaning of such propositions is determined by the internal logic of the topos (Set resp.
SetV(R)
op
). In the classical case, where Set is used, this is the ordinary Boolean logic
that we are familiar with. In the quantum case, the internal logic of the presheaf topos
SetV(R)
op
has to be used. This intuitionistic logic can be interpreted using Kripke-Joyal
semantics, see e.g. chapter VI in [MM92].
The Heyting algebra structure of subobjects. In the next section, we discuss
the representation of states in the topos SetV(R)
op
and the assignment of truth-values to
propositions. Before doing so, it is worth noting that the subobjects of Σ form a Heyting
algebra (since the subobjects of any object in a topos do), so we have mapped propositions
“A ∈ ∆” (understood as discussed) to a distributive lattice with a pseudocomplement. To-
gether with the results from the next section, we have a completely new form of quantum
logic, based upon the internal logic of the presheaf topos SetV(R)
op
. Since this is a distribu-
tive logic and since the internal logic of a topos has powerful rules of inference, this kind
of quantum logic is potentially much better interpretable than ordinary quantum logic of
the Birkhoff-von Neumann kind. The latter type of quantum logic and its generalisations
are based on nondistributive structures and lack a deductive system.
5 Truth objects and truth-values
In classical physics, a state is just a point of state space.13 Since, as we saw, the spectral
presheaf Σ has no elements (or, global elements14), we must represent states differently in
the presheaf topos SetV(R)
op
.
5.1 Generalised elements as generalised states
One direct way, suggested in [HS07], is the following generalisation: Σ has no global
elements 1 → Σ, but it does have subobjects U →֒ Σ. In algebraic geometry and more
generally in category theory, such monics (and, more generally, arbitrary arrows) are called
12This is a well-defined categorical construction, since the pullback of a monic is a monic, so we get a
subobject of Σ from a subobject of R↔.
13One might call this a pure state, though this is not customary in classical physics. Such a state actually
is a point measure on state space, in contrast to more general probability measures that describe
general states. We only consider pure states here and identify the point measure with the corresonding
point of state space.
14Elements 1 → P of a presheaf P are called global elements or global sections in category theory. We
follow this convention to avoid confusion with points or elements of sets.
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generalised elements [LR03]. We could postulate that these subobjects, or some of them,
are ‘generalised states’. Consider another subobject of Σ that represents a proposition
“A ∈ ∆” about the quantum system, given by its characteristic arrow χS : Σ→ Ω. Then
we can compose these arrows
U →֒ Σ→ Ω
to obtain an arrow U → Ω. This is not a global element 1→ Ω of Ω, and by construction,
it cannot be, since Σ has no global elements, but it is a generalised element of Ω. It
might be possible to give a physical meaning to these arrows U → Ω if one can (a) give
physical meaning to the subobject U →֒ Σ, making clear what a generalised state actually
is, and (b) give a logical and physical interpretation of an arrow U → Ω. While a global
element 1 → Ω is interpreted as a truth-value in the internal logic of a topos, the logical
interpretation of an arrow U → Ω is not so clear.
We want to emphasise that mathematically, the above construction is perfectly well-
defined. It remains to be worked out if a physical and logical meaning can be attached to
it.
5.2 The construction of truth objects
We now turn to the construction of so-called ‘truth objects’ from pure quantum states ψ,
see also [DI07b]. (To be precise, a unit vector ψ in the Hilbert space H represents a vector
state ϕψ : R → C on a von Neumann algebra, given by ϕψ(Â) := 〈ψ| Â |ψ〉 for all Â ∈ R.
If R = B(H), then every ϕψ is a pure state.) Of course, the Hilbert space H is the Hilbert
space on which the von Neumann algebra of observables R ⊆ B(H) is represented. This is
the most direct way in which Hilbert space actually enters the mathematical constructions
inside the topos SetV(R)
op
. However, we will see how this direct appeal to Hilbert space
possibly can be circumvented.
Given a subobject of Σ that represents some proposition, a truth object will allow us
to construct a global element 1 → Σ of Σ, as we will show in subsection 5.4. This means
that from a proposition and a state, we do get an actual truth-value for that proposition
in the internal logic of the topos SetV(R)
op
. The construction of truth objects is a direct
generalisation of the classical case.
For the moment, let us consider sets. Let S be a subset of some larger set X , and let
x ∈ X . Then
(x ∈ S)⇔ (S ∈ U(x)),
where U(x) denotes the set of neighbourhoods of x in X . The key observation is that while
the l.h.s. cannot be generalised to the topos setting, since we cannot talk about points like
x, the r.h.s. can. The task is to define neighbourhoods in a suitable manner. We observe
that U(x) is a subset of the power set PX = P (X), which is the same as an element of
the power set of the power set PPX = P (P (X)).
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This leads to the idea that for each context V ∈ V(R), we must choose an appropriate
set of subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV such that these sets of subsets form an element
in PPΣ. Additionally, the subsets we choose at each stage V should be clopen, since the
clopen subsets Pcl(ΣV ) form a lattice that is isomorphic to the lattice P(V ) of projections
in V .
The main difficulty lies in the fact that the spectral presheaf Σ has no global elements,
which is equivalent to the Kochen-Specker theorem. A global element, if it existed, would
pick one point λV from each Gel’fand spectrum ΣV (V ∈ V(R)) such that, whenever
V ′ ⊂ V , we would have λV ′ = λV |V ′ . If we had such global elements, we could define
neighbourhoods for them by taking, for each V ∈ V(R), neighbourhoods of λV in ΣV .
Since no such global elements exist, we cannot expect to have neighbourhoods of points
at each stage. Rather, we will get neighbourhoods of sets at each stage V , and only for
particular V , these sets will have just one element. In any case, the sets will depend on
the state ψ in a straighforward manner. We define:
Definition 4 Let ψ ∈ H be a unit vector, let P̂ψ the projection onto the corresponding one-
dimensional subspace (i.e., ray) of H, and let Pcl(ΣV ) be the clopen subsets of the Gel’fand
spectrum ΣV . If S ∈ Pcl(ΣV ), then P̂S ∈ P(V ) denotes the corresponding projection. The
truth object Tψ = (TψV )V ∈V(R) is given by
∀V ∈ V(R) : TψV := {S ∈ Pcl(ΣV ) | 〈ψ| P̂S |ψ〉 = 1}.
At each stage V , TψV collects all subsets S of ΣV such that the expectation value of the
projection corresponding to this subset is 1. From this definition, it is not clear at first
sight that the set TψV can be seen as a set of neighbourhoods.
Lemma 5 We have the following equalities:
∀V ∈ V(R) : TψV = {S ∈ Pcl(ΣV ) | 〈ψ| P̂S |ψ〉 = 1}
= {S ∈ Pcl(ΣV ) | P̂S ≥ P̂ψ}
= {S ∈ Pcl(ΣV ) | P̂S ≥ δ
o(P̂ψ)V }
= {S ∈ Pcl(ΣV ) | S ⊇ Sδo( bPψ)V }.
Proof. If 〈ψ| P̂S |ψ〉 = 1, then ψ lies entirely in the subspace of Hilbert space that P̂S
projects onto. This is equivalent to P̂S ≥ P̂ψ. Since P̂S ∈ P(V ) and δ
o(P̂ψ)V is the smallest
projection in V that is larger than P̂ψ,
15 we also have P̂S ≥ δ
o(P̂ψ)V . In the last step, we
simply go from the projections in V to the corresponding clopen subsets of ΣV .
This reformulation shows that TψV actually consists of subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum
ΣV that can be seen as some kind of neigbourhoods, not of a single point of ΣV , but of
a certain subset of ΣV , namely Sδo( bPψ)V . In the simplest case, we have P̂ψ ∈ P(V ), so
15On projections, the spectral order ≤s and the linear order ≤ coincide.
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δo(P̂ψ)V = P̂ψ. Then Sδo( bPψ)V = S bPψ , and this subset contains a single element, namely
the pure state λ such that
λ(P̂ψ) = 1
and λ(Q̂) = 0 for all Q̂ ∈ P(V ) such that Q̂P̂ψ = 0. In this case, T
ψ
V actually consists of
all the clopen neighbourhoods of the point λ in ΣV .
In general, if P̂ψ does not lie in the projections P(V ), then there is no subset of ΣV
that corresponds directly to P̂ψ. We must first approximate P̂ψ by a projection in V , and
δo(P̂ψ)V is the smallest projection in V larger than P̂ψ. The projection δ
o(P̂ψ)V corresponds
to a subset Sδo( bPψ)V ⊆ ΣV that may contain more than one element. However, T
ψ
V can still
be seen as a set of neighbourhoods, but now of this set Sδo( bPψ)V rather than of a single
point.
It is an interesting and non-trivial point that the (outer) daseinisation δo(P̂ψ)V (V ∈
V(R)) shows up in this construction. We did not discuss this here, but the subobjects of Σ
constructed from the outer daseinisation of projections play a central roˆle in the represen-
tation of a certain propositional language PL(S) that one can attach to a physical system
S [DI07a, DI07b]. Moreover, these subobjects are ‘optimal’ in the sense that, whenever
V ′ ⊂ V , the restriction from Sδo( bP )V to Sδo( bP )V ′ is surjective, see Theorem 3.1 in [DI07b].
This property can also lead the way to a more internal characterisation of truth-objects,
without reference to a state ψ and hence to Hilbert space.
5.3 Truth objects and Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic
There is yet another point of view on what a truth object Tψ is, closer the ordinary quantum
logic, which goes back to the famous paper [BV36] by Birkhoff and von Neumann. For
now, let us assume that R = B(H), then we write P(H) := P(B(H)) for the lattice
of projections on Hilbert space. In their paper, Birkhoff and von Neumann identify a
proposition “A ∈ ∆” about a quantum system with a projection operator Ê[A ∈ ∆] ∈
P(H) via the spectral theorem [KR83] and interpret the lattice structure of P(H) as
giving a quantum logic. This is very different from the topos form of quantum logic, since
P(H) is a non-distributive lattice, leading to all the well-known interpretational difficulties.
Nonetheless, in this subsection we want to interpret truth objects from the perspective of
Birkhoff-von Neumann quantum logic.
The implication in ordinary quantum logic is given by the partial order on P(H): a
proposition “A ∈ ∆1” implies a proposition “B ∈ ∆2” (where we can have B = A) if and
only if Ê[A ∈ ∆1] ≤ Ê[B ∈ ∆2] holds for the corresponding projections.
The idea now is that, given a pure state ψ and the corresponding projection P̂ψ onto a
ray, we can collect all the projections larger than or equal to P̂ψ. We denote this by
T ψ := {P̂ ∈ P(H) | P̂ ≥ P̂ψ}.
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The propositions represented by these projections are exactly those propositions about the
quantum system that are (totally) true if the system is in the state ψ. Totally true means
‘true with probability 1’ in an instrumentalist interpretation. If, for example, a projection
Ê[A ∈ ∆] is larger than P̂ψ and hence contained in T
ψ, then, upon measurement of the
physical quantity A, we will find the measurement result to lie in the set ∆ with certainty
(i.e., with probability 1).
T ψ is a maximal (proper) filter in P(H). Every pure state ψ gives rise to such a maximal
filter T ψ, and clearly, the mapping ψ 7→ T ψ is injective. We can obtain the truth object
Tψ from the maximal filter T ψ simply by defining
∀V ∈ V(R) : TψV := T
ψ ∩ V.
In each context V , we collect all the projections larger than P̂ψ. On the level of proposi-
tions, we have all the propositions about physical quantities A in the context V that are
totally true in the state ψ.
5.4 The assignment of truth-values to propositions
We return to the consideration of the internal logic of the topos SetV(R)
op
and show how to
define a global element 1→ Ω of the subobject classifier from a clopen subobject S of Σ and
a truth object Tψ. The subobject S represents a proposition about the quantum system,
the truth object Tψ represents a state, and the global element of Ω will be interpreted as the
truth-value of the proposition in the given state. Thus, we make use of the internal logic
of the topos SetV(R)
op
of presheaves over the context category V(R) to assign truth-values
to all propositions about a quantum system.
It is well known that the subobject classifier Ω in a topos of presheaves is the presheaf
of sieves (see e.g. [MM92]). A sieve σ on an object A in some category C is a collection of
arrows with codomain A with the following property: if f : B → A is in σ and g : C → B
is another arrow in C, then f ◦ g : C → A is in σ, too. In other words, a sieve on A is
a downward closed set of arrows with codomain A. Since the context category V(R) is a
partially ordered set, things become very simple: the only arrows with codomain V are the
inclusions iV ′V . Since such an arrow is specified uniquely by its domain V
′, we can think
of the sieve σ on V as consisting of certain subalgebras V ′ of V . If V ′ ∈ σ and V ′′ ⊂ V ′,
then V ′′ ∈ σ.
The restriction mappings of the presheaf Ω are given by pullbacks of sieves. The pullback
of sieves over a partially ordered set takes a particularly simple form:
Lemma 6 If σ is a sieve on V ∈ V(R) and V ′ ⊂ V , then the pullback σ · iV ′V is given by
σ∩ ↓V ′. (This holds analogously for sieves on any partially ordered set, not just V(R)).
Proof. For the moment, we switch to the arrows notation. By definition, the pullback
σ · iV ′V is given by
σ · iV ′V := {iV ′′V ′ | iV ′V ◦ iV ′′V ′ ∈ σ}.
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We now identify arrows and subalgebras as usual and obtain (using the fact that V ′′ ⊆ V ′
implies V ′′ ⊂ V )
{iV ′′V ′ | iV ′V ◦ iV ′′V ′ ∈ σ} ≃ {V
′′ ⊆ V ′ | V ′′ ∈ σ} =↓V ′ ∩ σ.
Since ↓ V ′ is the maximal sieve on V ′, the pullback σ · iV ′V is given as the intersection of
σ with the maximal sieve on V ′.
The name pSq of the subobject S is the unique arrow 1 → PΣ = ΩΣ into the power
object of Σ (i.e., the subobjects of Σ) that ‘picks out’ S among all subobjects. pSq is
a global element of PΣ. Here, one uses the fact that power objects behave like sets, in
particular, they have global elements. Since we assume that S is a clopen subobject, we
also get an arrow 1→ PclΣ into the clopen power object of Σ, see [DI07b]. We denote this
arrow by pSq, as well.
Since Tψ ∈ PPclΣ is a collection of clopen subobjects of Σ, it makes sense to ask if S
is among them; an expression like pSq ∈ Tψ is well-defined. We define, for all V ∈ V(R),
the valuation
v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V := {V
′ ⊆ V | S(V ′) ∈ TψV ′}.
At each stage V , we collect all those subalgebras of V such that S(V ′) is contained in TψV ′.
In order to construct a global element of the presheaf of sieves Ω, we must first show that
v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V is a sieve on V . In the proof we use the fact that the subobjects obtained
from daseinisation are optimal in a certain sense.
Proposition 7 v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V := {V
′ ⊆ V | S(V ′) ∈ TψV ′} is a sieve on V .
Proof. As usual, we identify an inclusion morphism iV ′V with V
′ itself, so a sieve on V
consists of certain subalgebras of V . We have to show that if V ′ ∈ v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V and
V ′′ ⊂ V ′, then V ′′ ∈ v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V . Now, V
′ ∈ v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V means that S(V
′) ∈ TψV ′,
which is eqivalent to S(V ′) ⊇ Sδo( bPψ)V ′ . Here, Sδo( bPψ)V ′ is the component at V
′ of the
sub-object S
δo( bPψ)
= (S
δo( bPψ)V
)V ∈V(R) of Σ obtained from daseinisation of P̂ψ. According
to Thm. 3.1 in [DI07b], the sub-object Sδo( bPψ) is optimal in the following sense: when
restricting from V ′ to V ′′, we have Σ(iV ′′V ′)(Sδo( bPψ)V ′ ) = Sδo( bPψ)V ′′ , i.e., the restriction is
surjective. By assumption, S(V ′) ⊇ Sδo( bPψ)V ′ , which implies
S(V ′′) ⊇ Σ(iV ′′V ′)(S(V
′)) ⊇ Σ(iV ′′V ′)(Sδo( bPψ)V ′
) = S
δo( bPψ)V ′′
.
This shows that S(V ′′) ∈ TψV ′′ and hence V
′′ ∈ v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V .
Finally, we have to show that the sieves v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V , V ∈ V(R), actually form a global
element of Ω, i.e., they all fit together under the restriction mappings of the presheaf Ω:
Proposition 8 The sieves v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V , V ∈ V(R), (see Prop. 7) form a global element
of Ω.
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Proof. From Lemma 6, is suffices to show that, whenever V ′ ⊂ V , we have v(pSq ∈
Tψ)V ′ = v(pSq ∈ T
ψ)V ∩ ↓V
′. If V ′′ ∈ v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V ′, then S(V
′′) ∈ TψV ′′ , which implies
V ′′ ∈ v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V . Conversely, if V
′′ ∈↓V ′ and V ′′ ∈ v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V , then, again,
S(V ′′) ∈ TψV ′′ , which implies V
′′ ∈ v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V ′.
The global element v(pSq ∈ Tψ) = (v(pSq ∈ Tψ)V )V ∈V(R) of Ω is interpreted as the
truth-value of the proposition represented by S ∈ Pcl(Σ) if the quantum system is in the
state ψ (resp. Tψ). This assignment of truth-values is
• contextual, since the contexts V ∈ V(R) play a central roˆle in the whole construction
• global in the sense that every proposition is assigned a truth-value
• completely independent of any notion of measurement or observer, hence we call our
scheme a ‘neo-realist’ formulation of quantum theory
• topos-internal, the logical structure is not chosen arbitrarily, but fixed by the topos
SetV(R)
op
. This topos is directly motivated from the Kochen-Specker theorem
• non-Boolean, since there are (a) more truth-values than just ‘true’ and ‘false’ and
(b) the global elements form a Heyting algebra, not a Boolean algebra. There is a
global element 1 of Ω, consisting of the maximal sieve ↓V at each stage V , which is
interpreted as ‘totally true’, and there is a global element 0 consisting of the empty
sieve for all V , which is interpreted as ‘totally false’. Apart from that, there are many
other global elements that represent truth-values between ‘totally true’ and ‘totally
false’. These truth-values are neither numbers nor probabilities, but are given by
the logical structure of the presheaf topos SetV(R)
op
. Since a Heyting algebra in
particular is a partially ordered set, there are truth-values v1, v2 such that neither
v1 < v2 nor v2 < v1, which is also different from two-valued Boolean logic where
simply 0 < 1 (i.e., ‘false’<‘true’). The presheaf topos SetV(R)
op
has a rich logical
structure.
6 Conclusion and outlook
The formulation of quantum theory within the presheaf topos SetV(R)
op
gives a theory
that is remarkably similar to classical physics from a structural perspective. In particular,
there is a state object (the spectral presheaf Σ) and a quantity-value object (the presheaf
R↔ of order-preserving and -reversing functions). Physical quantities are represented by
arrows between Σ and R↔.
One of the future tasks will be the incorporation of dynamics. The process of dasein-
isation behaves well with respect to the action of unitary operators, see section 5.2 in
[DI07c], so it is conceivable that there is a ‘Heisenberg picture’ of dynamics. Commutators
remain to be understood in the topos picture. On the other hand, it is possible to let a
truth-object Tψ change in time by applying Schro¨dinger evolution to ψ. It remains to be
shown how this can be understood topos-internally.
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Mulvey and Banaschewski have recently shown how to define the Gel’fand spectrum
of an abelian C∗-algebra A in any Grothendieck topos, using constructive methods (see
[BM06] and references therein). Spitters and Heunen made the following construction
in [HS07]: one takes a non-abelian C∗-algebra A and considers the topos of (covariant)
functors over the category of abelian subalgebras of A. The algebra A induces an internal
abelian C∗-algebra A in this topos of functors. (Internally, algebraic operations are only
allowed between commuting operators.) Spitters and Heunen observed that the Gel’fand
spectrum of this internal algebra basically is the spectral presheaf.16 It is very reassuring
that the spectral presheaf not only has a physical interpretation, but also such a nice and
natural mathematical one. Spitters and Heunen also discuss integration theory in the
constructive context. These tools will be very useful in order to regain actual numbers and
expectation values from the topos formalism.
Since the whole topos programme is based on the representation of formal languages,
major generalisations are possible. One can represent the same language L(S) in different
topoi, as we already did with Set for classical physics and SetV(R)
op
for algebraic quantum
theory. For physical theories going beyond this, other topoi will play a roˆle. The biggest
task is the incorporation of space-time concepts, which will, at the very least, necessitate
a change of the base category. It is also conceivable that the ‘smooth topoi’ of synthetic
differential geometry (SDG) will play a roˆle.
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